in at least two well-developed paragraphs (and a paragraph is at least five to seven sentences) discuss: The Supreme Court’s decision on Dred Scott’s status as a slave or free man had far reaching consequences for all black people in the United States, free or slave. What were some of the legal and political effects of the Dred Scott decision? cited in APA
I have attached resources and also a citation for attached resources.https://openstax.org/books/us-history/pages/1-introduction ch. 14
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On the Dred Scott Decision
Author: Abraham Lincoln
From: Civil Rights in America
Publisher: Primary Source Media
Series: American Journey
Document Type: Speech
Length: 5,816 words
Content Level: (Level 4)
Lexile Measure: 1230L
Commentary on On the Dred Scott Decision
In June 1858, Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865), the Republican nominee for U.S. senator from Illinois, boldly challenged Stephen A.
Douglas (1813-1861), the Democratic incumbent, to a series of seven debates around the state. In those days, debates were long
outdoor affairs, with each candidate speaking in turn for an hour and then for a half hour of rebuttal. At first glance, the two
contestants appeared to be ill-matched. Douglas, a well-groomed and polished speaker, was a powerful two-term senator and the
most important supporter of the 1840s version of popular sovereignty, in which the residents of a territory had the right to decide for
themselves whether to accept or reject slavery in their prospective state. Lincoln, a prominent Illinois lawyer and antislavery moderate
who had served one undistinguished term in the House of Representatives a decade earlier, seemed a poor opponent with his roughhewn face, squeaky voice, baggy clothes, and unshined shoes. But Lincoln grew in stature as a result of the debates, which were
followed in newspapers all over the nation.
The most famous of the Lincoln-Douglas debates came on August 27 in Freeport, where Lincoln impaled Douglas on the horns of a
dilemma: Suppose, he asked, that the people of a territory should vote slavery down? In the Dred Scott v. Sandford decision a year
earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court had decreed that no territory could exclude slavery. Who should prevail, the Court or the people?
Lincoln also mounted many other attacks on the Supreme Court ruling, which he strongly disliked
as did a majority of the voters in
this northern state.
Douglas tried to defend the Supreme Court. In the end, however, he replied that no matter how the Court had ruled, slavery could be
effectively excluded if the people did not vote to enforce it with local police regulations. With his so-called Freeport Doctrine, Douglas
ended up winning the Senate election but losing crucial support from proslavery southern Democrats, who broke away from the
national party in the 1860 presidential campaign. As the official (northern) Democratic nominee in a four-way race, Douglas won only
one state (Missouri), though he placed a distant second in the popular vote behind his 1858 rival, Abraham Lincoln.
The Dred Scott ruling was a major source of division in the nation, one of several that steadily fractured the nation and made the Civil
War (1861-1865) all but inevitable. Though he lost the Senate election, Lincoln’s firm opposition to the ruling won the argument in the
judgment of history. His remarks deserve careful reading, partly because of the attack he made against other Supreme Court
including, perhaps surprisingly, its ruling against polygamy in Utah.
Speech on the Dred Scott Decision, by Abraham Lincoln, June 26, 1857
I am here to-night, partly by the invitation of some of you, and partly by my own inclination. Two weeks ago
Judge Douglas spoke here on the several subjects of Kansas, the Dred Scott decision, and Utah. I listened to the speech at the time,
and have read the report of it since. It was intended to controvert opinions which I think just, and to assail (politically, not personally,)
those men who, in common with me, entertain those opinions. For this reason I wished then, and still wish, to make some answer to
it, which I now take the opportunity of doing.
I begin with Utah. If it prove to be true, as is probable, that the people of Utah are in open rebellion to the United States, then Judge
Douglas is in favor of repealing their territorial organization, and attaching them to the adjoining States for judicial purposes. I say,
too, if they are in rebellion, they ought to be somehow coerced to obedience; and I am not now prepared to admit or deny that the
Judge’s mode of coercing them is not as good as any. The Republicans can fall in with it without taking back anything they have ever
said. To be sure, it would be a considerable backing down by Judge Douglas from his much vaunted doctrine of self-government for
the territories; but this is only additional proof of what was very plain from the beginning, that that doctrine was a mere deceitful
pretense for the benefit of slavery. Those who could not see that much in the Nebraska act itself, which forced Governors, and
Secretaries, and Judges on the people of the territories, without their choice or consent, could not be made to see, though one should
rise from the dead to testify.
But in all this, it is very plain the Judge evades the only question the Republicans have ever pressed upon the Democracy in regard
to Utah. That question the Judge well knows to be this: “If the people of Utah shall peacefully form a State Constitution tolerating
polygamy, will the Democracy admit them into the Union?” There is nothing in the United States Constitution or law against
polygamy; and why is it not a part of the Judge’s “sacred right of self-government” for that people to have it, or rather to keep it, if they
choose? These questions, so far as I know, the Judge never answers. It might involve the Democracy to answer them either way,
and they go unanswered.
As to Kansas. The substance of the Judge’s speech on Kansas is an effort to put the free State men in the wrong for not voting at the
election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention. He says: “There is every reason to hope and believe that the law will be fairly
interpreted and impartially executed, so as to insure to every bona fide inhabitant the free and quiet exercise of the elective
It appears extraordinary that Judge Douglas should make such a statement. He knows that, by the law, no one can vote who has not
been registered; and he knows that the free State men place their refusal to vote on the ground that but few of them have been
registered. It is possible this is not true, but Judge Douglas knows it is asserted to be true in letters, newspapers and public
speeches, and borne by every mail, and blown by every breeze to the eyes and ears of the world. He knows it is boldly declared that
the people of many whole counties, and many whole neighborhoods in others, are left unregistered; yet, he does not venture to
contradict the declaration, nor to point out how they can vote without being registered; but he just slips along, not seeming to know
there is any such question of fact, and complacently declares: “There is every reason to hope and believe that the law will be fairly
and impartially executed, so as to insure to every bona fide inhabitant the free and quiet exercise of the elective franchise.”
I readily agree that if all had a chance to vote, they ought to have voted. If, on the contrary, as they allege, and Judge Douglas
ventures not to particularly contradict, few only of the free State men had a chance to vote, they were perfectly right in staying from
the polls in a body.
By the way since the Judge spoke, the Kansas election has come off. The Judge expressed his confidence that all the Democrats in
Kansas would do their duty-including “free state Democrats” of course. The returns received here as yet are very incomplete; but so
far as they go, they indicate that only about one sixth of the registered voters, have really voted; and this too, when not more,
perhaps, than one half of the rightful voters have been registered, thus showing the thing to have been altogether the most exquisite
farce ever enacted. I am watching with considerable interest, to ascertain what figure “the free state Democrats” cut in the concern.
Of course they voted
all democrats do their duty
and of course they did not vote for slave-state candidates. We soon shall
know how many delegates they elected, how many candidates they had, pledged for a free state; and how many votes were cast for
Allow me to barely whisper my suspicion that there were no such things in Kansas “as free state Democrats”-that they were
altogether mythical, good only to figure in newspapers and speeches in the free states. If there should prove to be one real living free
state Democrat in Kansas, I suggest that it might be well to catch him, and stuff and preserve his skin, as an interesting specimen of
that soon to be extinct variety of the genus, Democrat.
And now as to the Dred Scott decision. That decision declares two propositions
first, that a negro cannot sue in the U.S. Courts;
and secondly, that Congress cannot prohibit slavery in the Territories. It was made by a divided court
dividing differently on the
different points. Judge Douglas does not discuss the merits of the decision; and, in that respect, I shall follow his example, believing I
could no more improve on McLean and Curtis, than he could on Taney.
He denounces all who question the correctness of that decision, as offering violent resistance to it. But who resists it? Who has, in
spite of the decision, declared Dred Scott free, and resisted the authority of his master over him?
Judicial decisions have two uses
first, to absolutely determine the case decided, and secondly, to indicate to the public how other
similar cases will be decided when they arise. For the latter use, they are called “precedents” and “authorities.”
We believe, as much as Judge Douglas, (perhaps more) in obedience to, and respect for the judicial department of government. We
think its decisions on Constitutional questions, when fully settled, should control, not only the particular cases decided, but the
general policy of the country, subject to be disturbed only by amendments of the Constitution as provided in that instrument itself.
More than this would be revolution. But we think the Dred Scott decision is erroneous. We know the court that made it, has often
over-ruled its own decisions, and we shall do what we can to have it to over-rule this. We offer no resistance to it.
Judicial decisions are of greater or less authority as precedents, according to circumstances. That this should be so, accords both
with common sense, and the customary understanding of the legal profession.
If this important decision had been made by the unanimous concurrence of the judges, and without any apparent partisan bias, and in
accordance with legal public expectation, and with the steady practice of the departments throughout our history, and had been in no
part, based on assumed historical facts which are not really true; or, if wanting in some of these, it had been before the court more
than once, and had there been affirmed and re-affirmed through a course of years, it then might be, perhaps would be, factious, nay,
even revolutionary, to not acquiesce in it as a precedent.
But when, as it is true we find it wanting in all these claims to the public confidence, it is not resistance, it is not factious, it is not even
disrespectful, to treat it as not having yet quite established a settled doctrine for the country
But Judge Douglas considers this
view awful. Hear him:
“The courts are the tribunals prescribed by the Constitution and created by the authority of the people to determine, expound and
enforce the law. Hence, whoever resists the final decision of the highest judicial tribunal, aims a deadly blow to our whole Republican
system of government
a blow, which if successful would place all our rights and liberties at the mercy of passion, anarchy and
violence. I repeat, therefore, that if resistance to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, in a matter like the points
decided in the Dred Scott case, clearly within their jurisdiction as defined by the Constitution, shall be forced upon the country as a
political issue, it will become a distinct and naked issue between the friends and the enemies of the Constitution
the friends and
the enemies of the supremacy of the laws.”
Why this same Supreme court once decided a national bank to be constitutional; but Gen. Jackson, as President of the United
States, disregarded the decision, and vetoed a bill for a re-charter, partly on constitutional ground, declaring that each public
functionary must support the Constitution, “as he understands it.” But hear the General’s own words. Here they are, taken from his
“It is maintained by the advocates of the bank, that its constitutionality, in all its features, ought to be considered as settled by
precedent, and by the decision of the Supreme Court. To this conclusion I cannot assent. Mere precedent is a dangerous source of
authority, and should not be regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power, except where the acquiescence of the people
and the States can be considered as well settled. So far from this being the case on this subject, an argument against the bank might
be based on precedent. One Congress in 1791, decided in favor of a bank; another in 1811, decided against it. One Congress in
1815 decided against a bank; another in 1816 decided in its favor. Prior to the present congress, therefore the precedents drawn from
that source were equal. If we resort to the States, the expressions of legislative, judicial and executive opinions against the bank have
been probably to those in its favor as four to one. There is nothing in precedent, therefore, which if its authority were admitted, ought
to weigh in favor of the act before me.”
I drop the quotations merely to remark that all there ever was, in the way of precedent up to the Dred Scott decision, on the points
therein decided, had been against that decision. But hear Gen. Jackson further
“If the opinion of the Supreme court covered the whole ground of this act, it ought not to control the co-ordinate authorities of this
Government. The Congress, the executive and the court, must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each
public officer, who takes an oath to support the Constitution, swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is
understood by others.”
Again and again have I heard Judge Douglas denounce that bank decision, and applaud Gen. Jackson for disregarding it. It would be
interesting for him to look over his recent speech, and see how exactly his fierce philippics against us for resisting Supreme Court
decisions, fall upon his own head. It will call to his mind a long and fierce political war in this country, upon an issue which, in his own
language, and, of course, in his own changeless estimation, was “a distinct and naked issue between the friends and the enemies of
the Constitution,” and in which war he fought in the ranks of the enemies of the Constitution.
I have said, in substance, that the Dred Scott decision was, in part, based on assumed historical facts which were not really true; and
I ought not to leave the subject without giving some reasons for saying this; I therefore give an instance or two, which I think fully
sustain me. Chief Justice Taney, in delivering the opinion of the majority of the Court, insists at great length that negroes were no part
of the people who made, or for whom was made, the Declaration of Independence, or the Constitution of the United States.
On the contrary, Judge Curtis, in his dissenting opinion, shows that in five of the then thirteen states, to wit, New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey and North Carolina, free negroes were voters, and, in proportion to their numbers, had the
same part in making the Constitution that the white people had. He shows this with so much particularity as to leave no doubt of its
truth; and, as a sort of conclusion on that point, holds the following language:
“The Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States, through the action, in each State, of those
persons who were qualified by its laws to act thereon in behalf of themselves and all other citizens of the State. In some of the States,
as we have seen, colored persons were among those qualified by law to act on the subject. These colored persons were not only
included in the body of ‘the people of the United States,’ by whom the Constitution was ordained and established; but in at least five
of the States they had the power to act, and, doubtless, did act, by their suffrages, upon the question of its adoption.”
Again, Chief Justice Taney says: “It is difficult, at this day to realize the state of public opinion in relation to that unfortunate race,
which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time of the Declaration of Independence, and when the
Constitution of the United States was framed and adopted.” And again, after quoting from the Declaration, he says: “The general
words above quoted would seem to include the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day, would
be so understood.”
In these the Chief Justice does not directly assert, but plainly assumes, as a fact, that the public estimate of the black man is more
favorable now than it was in the days of the Revolution. This assumption is a mistake. In some trifling particulars, the condition of that
race has been ameliorated; but, as a whole, in this country, the change between then and now is decidedly the other way; and their
ultimate destiny has never appeared so hopeless as in the last three or four years. In two of the five States
New Jersey and North
that then gave the free negro the right of voting, the right has since been taken away; and in a third
has been greatly abridged; while it has not been extended, so far as I know, to a single additional State, though the number of the
States has more than doubled. In those days, as I understand, masters could, at their own pleasure, emancipate their slaves; but
since then, such legal restraints have been made upon emancipation, as to amount almost to prohibition. In those days, Legislatures
held the unquestioned power to abolish slavery, in their respective States; but now it is becoming quite fashionable for State
Constitutions to withhold that power from the Legislatures. In those days, by common consent, the spread of the black man’s
bondage to new countries was prohibited; but now, Congress decides that it will not continue the prohibition, and the Supreme Court
decides that it could not if it would. In those days, our Declaration of Independence was held sacred by all, and thought to include all;
but now, to aid in making the bondage of the negro universal and eternal, it is assailed, and sneered at, and construed, and hawked
at, and torn, till, if its framers could rise from their graves, they could not at all recognize it. All the powers of earth seem rapidly
combining against him. Mammon is after him; ambition follows, and philosophy follows, and the Theology of the day is fast joining the
cry. They have him in his prison house; they have searched his person, and left no prying instrument with him. One after another they
have closed the heavy iron doors upon him, and now they have him, as it were, bolted in with a lock of a hundred keys, which can
never be unlocked without the concurrent of every key; the keys in the hands of a hundred different men, and they scattered to a
hundred different and distant places; and they stand musing as to what invention, in all the dominions of mind and matter, can be
produced to make the impossibility of his escape more complete than it is.
It is grossly incorrect to say or assume, that the public estimate of the negro is more favorable now than it was at the origin of the
Three years and a half ago, Judge Douglas brought forward his famous Nebraska bill. The country was at once in a blaze. He
scorned all opposition, and carried it through Congress. Since then he has seen himself superseded in a Presidential nomination, by
one indorsing the general doctrine of his measure, but at the same time standing clear of the odium of its untimely agitation, and its
gross breach of national faith; and he has seen that successful rival Constitutionally elected, not by the strength of friends, but by the
division of adversaries, being in a popular minority of nearly four hundred thousand votes. He has seen his chief aids in his own
State, Shields and Richardson, politically speaking, successively tried, convicted, and executed, for an offense not their own, but his.
And now he sees his own case, standing next on the docket for trial.
There is a natural disgust in the minds of nearly all white people, to the idea of an indiscriminate amalgamation of the white and black
races; and Judge Douglas evidently is basing his chief hope, upon the chances of being able to appropriate the benefit of this disgust
to himself. If he can, by much drumming and repeating, fasten the odium of that idea upon his adversaries, he thinks he can struggle
through the storm. He therefore clings to this hope, as a drowning man to the last plank. He makes an occasion for lugging it in from
the opposition to the Dred Scott decision. He finds the Republicans insisting that the Declaration of Independence includes ALL men,
black as well as white; and forthwith he boldly denies that it includes negroes at all, and proceeds to argue gravely that all who
contend it does, do so only because they want to vote, and eat, and sleep, and marry with negroes! He will have it that they cannot
be consistent else. Now I protest against that counterfeit logic which concludes that, because I do not want a black woman for a slave
I must necessarily want her for a wife. I need not have her for either, I can just leave her alone. In some respects she certainly is not
my equal; but in her natural right to eat the bread she earns with her own hands without asking leave of any one else, she is my
equal, and the equal of all others.
Chief Justice Taney, in his opinion in the Dred Scott case, admits that the language of the Declaration is broad enough to include the
whole human family, but he and Judge Douglas argue that the authors of that instrument did not intend to include negroes, by the
fact that they did not at once, actually place them on an equality with the whites. Now this grave argument comes to just nothing at
all, by the other fact, that they did not at once, or ever afterwards, actually place all white people on an equality with one or another.
And this is the staple argument of both the Chief Justice and the Senator, for doing this obvious violence to the plain unmistakable
language of the Declaration. I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to include all men, but they did not intend to
declare all men equal in all respects. They did not mean to say all were equal in color, size, intellect, moral developments, or social
capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness, in what respects they did consider all men created equal
equal in “certain
inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” This they said, and this meant. They did not mean to
assert the obvious untruth, that all were then actually enjoying that equality, nor yet, that they were about to confer it immediately
upon them. In fact they had no power to confer such a boon. They meant simply to declare the right, so that the enforcement of it
might follow as fast as circumstances should permit. They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society, which should be familiar
to all, and revered by all; constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, constantly
approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all
people of all colors everywhere. The assertion that “all men are created equal” was of no practical use in effecting our separation
from Great Britain; and it was placed in the Declaration, not for that, but for future use. Its authors meant it to be, thank God, it is now
proving itself, a stumbling block to those who in after times might seek to turn a free people back into the hateful paths of despotism.
They knew the proneness of prosperity to breed tyrants, and they meant when such should re-appear in this fair land and commence
their vocation they should find left for them at least one hard nut to crack.
I have now briefly expressed my view of the meaning and objects of that part of the Declaration of Independence which declares that
“all men are created equal.”
Now let us hear Judge Douglas’ view of the same subject, as I find it in the printed report of his late speech. Here it is:
“No man can vindicate the character, motives and conduct of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, except upon the
hypothesis that they referred to the white race alone, and not to the African, when they declared all men to have been created
that they were speaking of British subjects on this continent being equal to British subjects born and residing in Great
that they were entitled to the same inalienable rights, and among them were enumerated life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness. The Declaration was adopted for the purpose of justifying the colonists in the eyes of the civilized world in withdrawing
their allegiance from the British crown, and dissolving their connection with the mother country.”
My good friends, read that carefully over some leisure hour, and ponder well upon it
makes of our once glorious Declaration.
see what a mere wreck
“They were speaking of British subjects on this continent being equal to British subjects born and residing in Great Britain!” Why,
according to this, not only negroes but white people outside of Great Britain and America are not spoken of in that instrument. The
English, Irish and Scotch, along with white Americans, were included to be sure, but the French, Germans and other white people of
the world are all gone to pot along with the Judge’s inferior races.
I had thought the Declaration promised something better than the condition of British subjects; but no, it only meant that we should be
equal to them in their own oppressed and unequal condition. According to that, it gave no promise that having kicked off the King and
Lords of Great Britain, we should not at once be saddled with a King and Lords of our own.
I had thought the Declaration contemplated the progressive improvement in the condition of all men everywhere; but no, it merely
“was adopted for the purpose of justifying the colonists in the eyes of the civilized world in withdrawing their allegiance from the
British crown, and dissolving their connection with the mother country.” Why, that object having been effected some eighty years ago,
the Declaration is of no practical use now
old wadding left to rot on the battle-field after the victory is won.
I understand you are preparing to celebrate the “Fourth,” to-morrow week. What for? The doings of that day had no reference to the
present; and quite half of you are not even descendants of those who were referred to at that day. But I suppose you will celebrate;
and will even go so far as to read the Declaration. Suppose after you read it once in the old fashioned way, you read it once more
with Judge Douglas’ version. It will then run thus: “We hold these truths to be self-evident that all British subjects who were on this
continent eighty-one years ago, were created equal to all British subjects born and then residing in Great Britain.”
And now I appeal to all
to Democrats as well as others,
are you really willing that the Declaration shall be thus frittered
thus left no more at most, than an interesting memorial of the dead past? thus shorn of its vitality, and practical value; and
left without the germ or even the suggestion of the individual rights of man in it?
But Judge Douglas is especially horrified at the thought of the mixing blood by the white and black races: agreed for once
thousand times agreed. There are white men enough to marry all the white women, and black men enough to marry all the black
women; and so let them be married. On this point we fully agree with the Judge; and when he shall show that his policy is better
adapted to prevent amalgamation than ours we shall drop ours, and adopt his. Let us see. In 1850 there were in the United States,
405,751, mulattoes. Very few of these are the offspring of whites and free blacks; nearly all have sprung from black slaves and white
masters. A separation of the races is the only perfect preventive of amalgamation but as all immediate separation is impossible the
next best thing is to keep them apart where they are not already together. If white and black people never get together in Kansas,
they will never mix blood in Kansas. That is at least one self-evident truth. A few free colored persons may get into the free States, in
any event; but their number is too insignificant to amount to much in the way of mixing blood. In 1850 there were in the free states,
56,649 mulattoes; but for the most part they were not born there
they came from the slave States, ready made up. In the same
year the slave States had 348,874 mulattoes all of home production. The proportion of free mulattoes to free blacks
colored classes in the free states
is much greater in the slave than in the free states. It is worthy of note too, that among the free
states those which make the colored man the nearest to equal the white, have, proportionally the fewest mulattoes the least of
amalgamation. In New Hampshire, the State which goes farthest towards equality between the races, there are just 184 Mulattoes
while there are in Virginia
how many do you think? 79,775, being 23,126 more than in all the free States together.
These statistics show that slavery is the greatest source of amalgamation; and next to it, not the elevation, but the degeneration of
the free blacks. Yet Judge Douglas dreads the slightest restraints on the spread of slavery, and the slightest human recognition of the
negro, as tending horribly to amalgamation.
This very Dred Scott case affords a strong test as to which party most favors amalgamation, the Republicans or the dear unionsaving Democracy. Dred Scott, his wife and two daughters were all involved in the suit. We desired the court to have held that they
were citizens so far at least as to entitle them to a hearing as to whether they were free or not; and then, also, that they were in fact
and in law really free. Could we have had our way, the chances of these black girls, ever mixing their blood with that of white people,
would have been diminished at least to the extent that it could not have been without their consent. But Judge Douglas is delighted to
have them decided to be slaves, and not human enough to have a hearing, even if they were free, and thus left subject to the forced
concubinage of their masters, and liable to become the mothers of mulattoes in spite of themselves
the very state of case that
produces nine tenths of all the mulattoes
all the mixing of blood in the nation.
Of course, I state this case as an illustration only, not meaning to say or intimate that the master of Dred Scott and his family, or any
more than a per centage of masters generally, are inclined to exercise this particular power which they hold over their female slaves.
I have said that the separation of the races is the only perfect preventive of amalgamation. I have no right to say all the members of
the Republican party are in favor of this, nor to say that as a party they are in favor of it. There is nothing in their platform directly on
the subject. But I can say a very large proportion of its members are for it, and that the chief plank in their platform
the spread of slavery
is most favorable to that separation.
Such separation, if ever effected at all, must be effected by colonization; and no political party, as such, is now doing anything directly
for colonization. Party operations at present only favor or retard colonization incidentally. The enterprise is a difficult one; but “when
there is a will there is a way;” and what colonization needs most is a hearty will. Will springs from the two elements of moral sense
and self-interest. Let us be brought to believe it is morally right, and, at the same time, favorable to, or, at least, not against, our
interest, to transfer the African to his native clime, and we shall find a way to do it, however great the task may be. The children of
Israel, to such numbers as to include four hundred thousand fighting men, went out of Egyptian bondage in a body.
How differently the respective courses of the Democratic and Republican parties incidentally bear on the question of forming a
a public sentiment
for colonization, is easy to see. The Republicans inculcate, with whatever of ability
they can, that the
negro is a man; that his bondage is cruelly wrong, and that the field of his oppression ought not to be enlarged. The Democrats deny
his manhood; deny, or dwarf to insignificance, the wrong of his bondage; so far as possible, crush all sympathy for him, and cultivate
and excite hatred and disgust against him; compliment themselves as Union-savers for doing so; and call the indefinite outspreading
of his bondage “a sacred right of self-government.”
The plainest print cannot be read through a gold eagle; and it will be ever hard to find many men who will send a slave to Liberia, and
pay his passage while they can send him to a new country, Kansas for instance, and sell him for fifteen hundred dollars, and the rise.
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Gale Document Number: GALE|EJ2163000134
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Dred Case Impacts
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