Description
Consider variants of the n-hunter Stag
Hunt in which only m hunters, with 2 ≤ m < n, need to pursue the stag in order to
catch it. (Continue to assume that there is a single stag.) Assume that a captured stag
is shared only by the hunters who catch it. Under each of the following assumptions on
the hunters’ preferences, find the Nash equilibria of the strategic game that models the
situation. a. Each hunter prefers the fraction 1/n of the stag to a hare. b. Each hunter prefers the fraction 1/k of the stag to a hare, but prefers a hare to any
smaller fraction of the stag, where k is an integer with m ≤ k ≤ n. c. Suppose there is a church of hunters that always receives 1/10 of the stag (and nothing
from the hare) and returns nothing to the hunters. How does it affect the behavior
of hunters in the equilibria of the game?
Explanation & Answer:
11 pages
Tags:
mathematics
Behavior
Game Theory
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